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There are two main ways to shoot down an idea, in politics as elsewhere. One is to say that it is
bad. Another is to say that it is ‘not realistic’. Often, it is easier to reach for the second. Few people
want to say, for example, that a society in which everyone’s needs are met and all are able to ﬁnd
fulﬁlment in their productive activities is not an attractive prospect. But many more will say that this
is not on the cards, for some reason: because of the political climate, ‘public opinion’, ‘human
nature’, or whatever else. The kind of scheme that promises such goods either has no chance of
being enacted in the ﬁrst place, or if it were enacted, would dramatically fail to deliver its promise:
it simply wouldn’t ‘work’.
This reply is not reserved for avowedly revolutionary politics. It is also used to deﬂect and discredit
proposals that lie squarely within the parameters of existing political systems. The Tories’ George
Osborne, for example, will not profess—openly, at least—anything but the utmost concern for the
welfare and prosperity of ordinary ‘working families’. Instead, he argues that any alternative to his
party’s brutal austerity is unrealistic as a means of improving the lives of even the worst off in
society: Britain will ‘go bust’, ‘borrow beyond its means’, and the poor will suffer even more. And
from the moment that Jeremy Corbyn began seriously to rattle the machinery of the British political
Establishment—by looking like he might actually win the Labour leadership contest, rather than
sitting unthreateningly on the ballot paper as proof of the broadmindedness and generosity of his
opponents—one word was repeated more than any other, apparently in a desperate hope that
saying might make it so: Corbyn was ‘unelectable’.
Like the Tories’ Thatcherite rhetoric of ‘There Is No Alternative’, the declarations of Corbyn’s
unelectability are claims about what is (and is not) ‘realistic’. Part of the reason Corbyn will not be
elected, they claim, is that ‘public opinion’ will quite rightly recoil from the prospect of a Corbyn-led
Britain. But in saying that he is ‘unelectable’, their emphasis is on the alleged fact of unelectability
itself, not on whatever it is about him that explains or justiﬁes this alleged fact. (Of course, it is
clear enough that many of the same voices would also be deeply dismayed if the unrealistic were
somehow to come to pass: Corbyn is a Bad Thing.) By talking in terms of unelectability,
presumably, they hope to sway those who don’t personally think that Corbyn is wrong or
dangerous: we may agree with him—we are supposed to think—but he’s just not electable, and so
with heavy hearts we must turn our backs on him, to save the Labour Party from the oft-mentioned
‘wilderness’, and the nation from the Greater Tory Evil.
People judge and describe things as ‘realistic’ or ‘unrealistic’ for political reasons—in every sense
of the word ‘political’. They will, for example, use judgements of what is ‘realistic’ and ‘unrealistic’
to make certain events more or less likely. If repeated often enough, the claim that Corbyn is
‘unelectable’ may actually succeed in making it so. And cries of ‘Unrealistic!’ can be political in the
sense of functioning as a thin cover for expressions of distaste, where for whatever reason it is
impolitic to cry ‘Bad!’. The discourse around Corbyn’s leadership illustrates particularly clearly the
extent to which what counts as ‘realistic’ is subject to political forces. For he has been called
‘unelectable’ when all the usual indicators—opinion polls, his constituency record of returning
majorities over the last eight elections—seem to point in the opposite direction. Without any sense
of irony, we are told, effectively: ‘Don’t elect him, he’s unelectable!’
The fact that such discourse can be used not only to further political ends, but to disguise overtly
political ‘value’ judgements, shows us something important. The masking effect can only work
thanks to a tendency to see judgements of what is ‘realistic’ as somehow non-political. They may,
of course, be used for political purposes (as can virtually anything), but—we are supposed to think
—they are not in themselves political judgements in the way that other judgements are—like, for
example, the judgement that re-nationalizing the railways would be a bad idea, or that Corbyn is a
threat to ‘our national security’.
On inspection, many of these paradigmatically ‘political’ judgements may show themselves to
assume or imply something about what is and is not ‘realistic’—and so by the logic under
consideration here, they would cease to be political too. But let us leave that aside. What I want to
highlight here is a certain way of thinking about the role, relative to politics, of concepts such as
‘being realistic’—a way of thinking that I believe is very pervasive, although it almost always
remains unarticulated. According to this way of thinking, there are, on the one hand, political
positions, proposals, and judgements; and on the other hand, there is a stock of ‘referee’ notions
or devices, which we may use to approach, compare, and assess these political objects. For
example, when weighing up the relative merits of two theories, we may ask which is the more
‘coherent’ or ‘intuitive’. Or when considering a practical proposal, we may ask whether it is detailed
enough and, above all, whether it is ‘realistic’. Here, detail, coherence, intuitive ﬁt, and ‘realistic-
ness’ act as our standards, and the candidates that we think score the highest, relative to those
standards, are the ones that should ﬁnd our favour: they provide the independent basis upon
which political conclusions may be reached and rested.
Invariably, however—and this is particularly clear in the case of ‘being realistic’—the notions in
question turn out to be in some way political already. What counts as ‘realistic’ obviously depends
on how you think the world works: it depends on what you think people are like, what you think
they are capable of and will (and will not) tolerate; and it depends on what you take to be the
characteristics, tendencies, and prospects of social and economic systems like capitalism. To see
this is to be in a position to look more critically at the near-universal tendency to equate the more
realistic with that which involves the smaller deviation from the status quo. Small changes often
are easier to bring about than larger ones. Sometimes they are also more sustainable. But when
and to what extent this is the case is a contested matter—and the contestation is essentially
political.
The point is most clearly made via an analogy. Suppose we are arguing about how best to
promote the health of a patient: you propose a programme of far-reaching lifestyle changes,
involving diet, exercise, and so on; and I propose something far more modest—perhaps a 20-
minute walk every Boxing Day, and a yoghurt drink on Sundays. In this case, it may well be that
my proposal is woefully inadequate and will almost certainly lead, before long, to the patient’s
untimely demise. However, I claim that my proposal is the more realistic. Yours, after all, involves
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rather radical changes, which will be very difﬁcult, and which the patient may not be prepared to
stick to. What anti-capitalists and others classed as ‘radicals’ or ‘extremists’ may say is that the
political status quo is as deadly and unsustainable as this patient’s current lifestyle. Proposing
smaller changes is not more realistic, but less. For it pretends that the incumbent system, or any
minor variation on it, is compatible with an acceptable outcome, when in fact the only thing that
can support human ﬂourishing—or even human survival—is a more drastic re-organization of our
social life.
Of course, none of this provides a proof of the wisdom of revolutionary politics, or even of Jeremy
Corbyn. What it does say is that we do not necessarily have to accept our opponents’
interpretations of the standards that are used to arbitrate in political disagreements, even—and, I
would argue, especially—if those interpretations form a dominant narrative. There is no politically
neutral understanding of what it means to be ‘realistic’ in politics—and if we want to argue about
political questions, we will have to live with that. As for Corbyn, it would be foolish, in deﬁance of
the nay-sayers, to assume his invincibility, or to put all our eggs in his basket. The same powers
that repeat the mantra of his unelectability like a spell will continue to do whatever they can to
thwart him, along with all he stands for and all who stand with him. But if his story so far has taught
us anything, it is that there was a little more possibility—and a little less predictability—in our
politics than we thought.
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